Abstract: Current RFID ultralightweight authentication protocols have security pitfalls; thus, SURV, a potentially high-security protocol, based on the use of on-tag lightweight cryptography and on-reader standard cryptography, is proposed. Furthermore, the updating of internal values is only executed on tags and conditioned to a successful mutual authentication, which prunes desynchronization attacks. Results of performance and security analysis of SURV, and comparison with existing protocols, are presented.
Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) systems produce methodologies that offer data portability by embedding data in small devices (tags) that can be mobile and held within other objects. This data may include identification data to grant access authentication for several transactions or entry passes through secured checkpoints in different locations. The security and privacy issues for this data are vulnerable to various threats [1] - [4] . Recent studies in RFID have attempted to raise solutions for several applications within the field. The solutions offered are often hindered by the fact that, in most cases, different RFID deployments do not meet required security specifications and needs [5] - [7] , [2] . These solutions could also be hindered by other implementation obstacles such as cost and compliance with existing RFID standards.
RFID tags can be classified into several categories, each with a distinct processing capability. Each category can be implemented in more than one application domain, where the tag-price is the main factor in deciding the functionality and security features of the tag. Several studies [8] - [14] have agreed with Chien [15] in his classification of RFID tags into four different classes based on their security-related computational power: full-fledged, simple, lightweight, and ultralightweight.
Ultralightweight mutual authentication protocols are some of the most challenging areas in terms of security-related computational power. In these protocols, the tag can only implement simple bitwise operations such as XOR, AND, and OR, among others. In addition, the tags have very limited storage memory. The threat of attacks could hamper communication with the readers. Researchers have proposed protocols to bridge the gap between the limited capability of ultralightweight tags and the assumed security level variation of using modulus rotation function instead of hamming weight rotation. Additionally Peris-Lopez came out with MixBits function, which has a very tiny footprint and was obtained by using Genetic Programming (GP). In the MixBits function, the relation between inputs and outputs is highly non-linear (see the original paper for details [33] ). Gossamer was designed to cover the gaps in the UMAP family by releasing the bit dependency of messages and secret values. Nevertheless, desynchronization attacks for Gossamer have been proposed in [34] . Rama and Suganya [35] proposed an enhancement for Gossamer using a sign/logarithm number system. Recently, two passive attacks have been proposed in [36] . In conclusion, all ultralightweight mutual authentication protocols created so far are insufficiently robust to prevent security attacks.
SURV Protocol
A new protocol was developed utilizing the strengths and addressing the weaknesses of existing protocols, particularly the vulnerabilities in Gossamer. The aspiration in creating the new protocol was to produce an ultralightweight protocol with a higher security level and lower computational power requirements for lowcost RFID tags. The protocol presents transactions of privacy data combined with random values, encapsulated in shell values capable of transporting hidden data between the tag and the reader without compromising or revealing the aforementioned data. From its characteristics, the proposed protocol has been termed the Shelled Ultralightweight Randomized Value (SURV) protocol.
The SURV protocol focuses on securing the channel between the tag and the reader by presuming that the channel between the reader and the third entity, the backend database (DB), is already secured. From here, the reader, and database are treated as one entity. In the initial stage prior to starting any session, each tag is initialized with two keys (k1, k2) with fixed values and a tag ID (TID). We recommend that these two secret keys be changed from time to time to maintain a higher security level. These three values are shared with the database where (k1, k2) are indexed by TID. Each reader has two distinct fixed common secret keys for all tags: (Ke, Kh) encryption and hash keys. The reader on each transaction creates new four distinct values: i) a random number (R) hidden in a shell value (A), ii) a random number (N), iii) an encryption value (Ψ) holding the TID, and iv) a hash value (φ) preserving the messages' integrity. These four values overwrite their respective previous values in the tag.
The protocol consists of three phases: tag identification, mutual authentication, and tag updating. In the first phase, the reader sends "hello" message to the tag. The tag responds by obtaining the value Ri from the shell value A and using Ri to produce a new shell value B. Afterwards, the values Ψi, φi, Bi, and Ni are sent to the reader for tag identification purposes. The reader uses this data to extract the TID by decrypting Ψi using Ke, and locking-up the tag and its secret keys in the database. Then it starts the mutual authentication phase only if the TID was verified, where it validates the integrity of the data sent from the tag. The reader authenticates the tag by checking the hash value φi. Then, it generates a new shell value Ci to enable the tag to authenticate the reader. A new tuple of values A, Ψ, φ and N is also generated and is used to update the tag parameters. Finally, the reader sends these five values Ci, Ai+1, Ψi+1, φi+1, and Ni+1 to the tag. When the tag receives this message, it generates Rt' from its initial data, extracts Rt from the shell value Ci, and verifies if Rt'= Rt to complete the mutual authentication and ensure message integrity. If this phase is finished successfully, the third phase, tag updating, begins. This phase uses the rest of the data sent in the last message to update the tag and overwrite the tag parameters Ai, Ψi, φi, and Ni with the new data Ai+1, Ψi+1, φi+1, and Ni+1, respectively. The protocol procedures are described as follows.
Tag identification. In this phase, the reader begins the session by sending a "hello" message to the tag. The tag first resolves the Ai shell by inversing the function {Ai=Rot(Rot(Ri+k1+ π), k2), k1)} and extracting the value of the random number Ri. Next, it re-hides this value in shell Bi by {Bi=Rot(Rot((Ri+k2+ π ) ⨁ k1, k1), k2)+k2}, and sends a message to the reader using four tag parameters: Ψi, φi, Bi, and Ni. The reader uses Ke and Ni to obtain the TID using {TID=Dec(Ψi) ke ⨁ Ni}.
Mutual authentication. The reader locks-up the TID and the responding (k1, k2) from the database, resolves the Bi shell by inversing the function {Bi= Rot(Rot((TID +Ri +k2+ π )⨁ k1, k1 ⨁ k2), k2)+k2} and extracts the value of the random number Ri. Next, the reader refigures the hash value using {φi' = h(Ψi || Ri || TID)Kh} and compares this value with the responding value sent by the tag and verifies if {φi'=φi}. If true, the reader authenticates the tag and uses k1, k2 and Ri to compute Y via {Y= Rot(Ri ⨁ k2, k1)}. It then uses Y in creating RTemp via the function {RTemp=MixBits (Ri, Y)}. RTemp will thereafter be used in creating S via {S=Rot(Ai+1 +Ψi+1+ φi+1+ Ni+1) ⨁k1, RTemp)}, and both S and RTemp will be used to calculate Rt using two-chain MixBits in {Rt=MixBits (MixBits (S ,Y), RTemp)}. After this step, the reader hides Rt in shell Ci using the function {Ci= Rot(Rot((Rt + k2+ π ) ⨁ k1, Ri), k2+ Ri)+k1}, and creates new tag parameters as follows: Ai+1 = Rot (Rot (Ri+1+ k1+ π), k2) , k1), Ψi+1 = Enc(TID⨁Ni+1)Ke, φi+1 = h(Ψi+1|| Ri+1|| TID)Kh , Ci = Rot(Rot((Rt+k2+ π )⨁k1, Ri), k2+ Ri)+k1. These parameters (Ci, Ai+1, Ψi+1, φi+1 and Ni+1) will be sent in one message to the tag, where the tag calculates Rt', extracts Rt from Ci and verifies if Rt'=Rt to conclude the mutual authentication phase.
Tag updating. If Rt'=Rt is true, the third phase starts by overwriting the tag parameters Ai, Ψi, φi, and Ni with the new data Ai+1, Ψi+1, φi+1, and Ni+1 respectively, and then ends the session.
It can be seen from Fig. 1 that, three shells, A, B, and C, are generated in every session. This makes it difficult to predict the embedded values, which would be useless if obtained after the session termination. There are also two verification challenges, φ and Rt, allowing the system to terminate the unsuccessful session in three positions, including the TID lock-up, and starting a new session in another timeframe. 
Security Analysis
We conducted a security analysis against the most relevant threats to the security of our protocol. The analysis was conducted by investigating each attack and its requirement and properties.
User data confidentiality. The secret keys k1 and k2 are carefully hidden inside A, B, and C. In every new session, the keys are mixed with two different random numbers using the MixBits function. In fact, in our protocol, even if any of the sub-messages in either A, B, or C was broken, the tag identity will still be anonymous to the adversary. This is because the tag ID was encrypted after it was XORed with a random number using a secret key that exists only in the reader database. Therefore, the tag identity can be recognized only by legitimate readers.
Tag anonymity. The sub-messages are updated in each session transaction, and the authentication messages between the tag and the reader are mixed with random numbers. This renders the adversary unable to recognize the tag's location or trace it unless the adversary keeps interrupting the communication between the same tag and any legitimate reader, which leads to the transmission of the same message (Ψi || φi || Bi || Ni) every time. This scenario was not considered of any considerable value and had been ignored in most previous studies in the domain since the tag was unable to randomize itself due to its limited recourses. An in-depth analysis for all these scenarios has been given in detail in [37] .
Mutual authentication and data integrity. Our mutual authentication protocol can be performed only between legitimate readers and legitimate tags. This is because sub-messages A, B, and C can be generated using the common secret keys k1 and k2, which are only held in the tag and in the backend database. In addition, verifying the values of φ and Rt composed by the reader and the tag to the values φ' and Rt' respectively, provides strong data integrity validation.
Forward security. There are no possibilities for inferring any data from past communications between the tag and the reader because any previous data not overwritten by the end of the session will be dropped due to its uselessness. Keys k1 and k2 are not dropped; however, they are difficult to obtain and can be changed repeatedly, making this attack quite impossible. Assuming that tag is somehow compromised, there are still several unknown data variables in the server, such as Ke, Kh.
Resistance to replay attacks. An adversary might eavesdrop on any of the exchanged messages; however, it would not be useful to send it back to either the reader or the tag. This is because each message is based on random numbers that are changed in every successful authentication session. Accordingly, a replay attack can be detected immediately once the message is received by either the tag or the reader.
Data update confirmation and desynchronization. Most of the recent authentication protocols require updating the secret keys data between the tag and reader, which in cases where the transmitted data has been modified or even interrupted, leads to desynchronization. A de-synchronization attack is the first vulnerability that commonly appears in all the current protocols. In our protocol, the tag does not require the updating of its local data in other entities. Moreover, even if this message was modified or interrupted, any modification can be discovered easily when the values of φi and Rt are verified, and interruptions will not make any difference because the tag data will be updated only after receiving and verifying the last message. Thus, the reader is never affected by this and always obtains the original TID for every new session.
Resistance to man-in-the-middle attack and disclosure attacks. Man-in-the-middle attacks cannot affect SURV protocol since all exchanged messages are verified and all modifications can be simply detected. Similarly, in a disclosure attack where the attacker changes in any message sent from the reader to the tag (or vice-versa), SURV protocol will detect any change and ignore the message. Moreover, a meaningless message cannot affect the tag or the reader, but will only result in ending the current session unsuccessfully, enabling a new session to begin. Finally, to cover all possible threats to SURV, an adversary can perform DOS attacks against SURV by modifying any of the values in the message forwarded from the tag. This will either result in performing excessive TID lock-up processes in the database for invalid-TIDs when manipulating the Ψi or Ni values, or in the verification of a manipulated hash value(s). However, this attack will not have a significant effect because SURV uses a binary search algorithm for the TID lockup, which is fast where the lockup complexity is O(log n). Furthermore, the database in SURV maintains the following assumptions: that all values are fixed once added, the TIDs are serialized, and the data is indexed. Therefore, the resulting complexity value of O(1) for TID lockup minimizes the effect of DOS attacks. A comparison of Ultralightweight Authentication Protocol is shown in Table 1 . 
MixBits
L designates the bit length of variables used. 2 Rot(x, y) = x << wht(y), being wht(y) the Hamming weight of vector y. 3 Rot(x, y) = x << (y mod L) for a given value of L -in our case L = 96.
Performance Evaluation
The performance of our protocol can be measured by determining the computational cost, storage requirements, communication cost, and security level as the main points. The SURV protocol uses simple bitwise XOR, addition mod 2 96 , left hamming rotation, and MixBits function in the tag, and all of these operations can be simply implemented on-tag chip. In addition, we claim that SURV protocol implements strong security primitives (Ψ, φ), without adding any computational cost on the tag side. These primitives will not overload the tag with computational cost since all computational processes are performed on the backend server that has no severe limitations. Regarding storage requirements, tags that implementing SURV need to store values for Ψ, φ, A, N, k1 and k2, and each of these six values has a length of 96-bits, requiring a total of 576 bits of rewritable memory on the tag side. The TID and two common keys in the backend database have a total of 288 bits per tag. In terms of communication cost, the protocol in each session needs to exchange three messages, including the initial 5-byte "hello" message, four sub-messages in the second message with 384 bits, and five sub-messages in the third with 480 bits, creating a total of 904 bits from session-start until session-termination per session. The SURV protocol does not require any data updating in the database; thus, keeping the data sorted and leading to a higher search speed using binary search in retrieving the tag keys. Furthermore, SURV provides a better security level compared to UMAP family, SASI, and Gossamer, since one or more attacks have been proposed against each of these protocols, and because it also solves the desynchronization problem [34] , [37] proposed against the most recent protocol, Gossamer.
Conclusion
We have proposed SURV as a new ultralightweight authentication protocol capable of providing transactions of shell-values that are able to transport encapsulated encrypted privacy, data between the tag and the reader without compromising the transmitted data. This protocol guarantees the privacy and anonymity of tags' holder. The main advantage of the SURV protocol is each session is considered as an atom
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entity where no data from previous sessions are stored after session termination. Additionally, no data values can be updated on the tag side until all transactions have been executed and validated successfully, ensuring data integrity on the RFID tag, reader, and backend database entities at all times.
